

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LILONG 00505 01 OF 03 010131Z

ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
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INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 LILONGWE 0505

USCINCEIR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, MI

SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: A. CERP 0001 B. STATE 038356 (R 190052Z FEB 77)

PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENTS

A. U.S. INTERESTS

PRESENT U.S. INTERESTS IN MALAWI ARE MINIMAL. THE COUNTRY HAS VIRTUALLY NO STRATEGIC AND SMALL ECONOMIC INTEREST FOR THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE ABOUT 560 AMERICAN CITIZENS PRESENTLY RESIDENT IN THE COUNTRY -- THE MAJORITY OF THEM MISSIONARIES. LIFE PRESIDENT BANDA HAS OPTED OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE LEAVING HIS COUNTRY WITHOUT INFLUENCE IN AFRICA OR ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, OVER THE LONG RUN, AND PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY:

(1) EVOLUTION AWAY FROM THE AUTOCRATIC AND OPPRESSIVE BANDA REGIME TO ONE OF MODERATE LEADERSHIP WHICH DEMONSTRATES RESPECT
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 LILONG 00505 01 OF 03 010131Z

FOR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDGES ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS BEST SERVE BY CONTINUED CLOSE TIES TO THE WEST.

(2) ASSOCIATION WITH MALAWI'S SUCCESSFUL CASE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH DEMONSTRATES SOUND PRIORITIES, HONEST AND EFFICIENT USE OF AID, MINIMAL EXPENDITURES ON ARMAMENTS, AN OPEN ECONOMY WHICH WELCOMES PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THED

ABILITY TO ATTRACT OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID FROM MANY SOURCES.

(3) A SHIFT TO A MORE ANTIVIST FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WOULD GIVE MALAWI MORE WEIGHT AS AN ADVOCATE FOR MODERATION, PRAGMATISM AND MULTI-RACIAL TOLERANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE MARXIST REGIMES OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA AND A POSSIBLY RADICALIZED ZIMBABWE.

FOR OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN MALAWI TO BE MEANINGFUL, THE TRANSITION TO A POST-BANDA REGIME MUST OCCUR WITH A MINIMUM OF SHOCK SO AS NOT TO UPSET THE BASIC POSTURE OF MODERATION AND PRAGMATISM. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW FOR AN OPENING OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE, IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA (IF THIS HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED) AND AT LEAST TO SOME DEGREE, CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WOULD BRING MALAWI MORE IN LINE WITH THE AFRICAN SCENE. NO INSTITUTIONALIZED MECHANISM EXISTS FOR A TRANSITION AND I WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT A POWER STRUGGLE AMONG INDIVIDUALS AT THE TOP, BUT NOT ONE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE LITTLE PEOPLE -- THE VAST MAJORITY OF MALAWIANS. WHILE THE PROCESS OF CHANGE OBVIOUSLY HAS RISKS, GIVEN THE YEARS OF ABSOLUTE THOUGHT CONTROL, THE INSULAR POLITICAL AMBIENCE AND THE TRACTABLE NATURE OF MALAWIANS, I BELIEVE THAT IN THE CASE OF MALAWI IT WILL STOP SHORT OF RADICALIZATION. PRIMARILY I SEE MALAWI'S MAIN VALUE TO US AS AN EXAMPLE OF A SMALL, POOR, AND STRATEGICALLY UNIMPORTANT COUNTRY WHOSE STRESS ON QUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENT (LEGACIES OF BANDA) UNDER THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM CAN DEMONSTRATE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE LEFTIST PHILOSOPHIES SURROUNDING IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 LILONG 00505 01 OF 03 010131Z

B. OVERVIEW

LOOKING AHEAD ONE TO TWO YEARS,; 8 - 7.3)8*3 04ESIDENT BANDA WILL REMAIN ON THE SCENE. AT PRESENT THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT OF MALAWI IS CONDITIONED BY HIM. HIS IDEAS AND IDEALS ARE THE POLICY OF MALAWI. HE HAS WILLINGLY ISOLATED HIMSELF FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE AND RUNS THE COUNTRY AS HIS PERSONAL FIEFDOM. HE HAS MADE HIMSELF A GODLIKE IMAGE -- A FATHER FIGURE -- WHO IS REVERED BY THE GREAT MAJORITY OF MALAWIANS AS FOUNDER OF THE NATION, SUPREME TEACHER AND ULTIMATE PROVIDER. HOWEVER, HIS VINDICATIVE AND REPRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST OPPONENTS, REAL OR IMAGINED, AND PARTICULARLY AGAINST ACADEMICS AND NORTHERNERS (USUALLY THE SAME) HAS ALIENATED BUT COWED THE SMALL INTELLIGENTSIA. TODAY THERE IS NO ORGANIZATION OR PRESSURE GROUP TO CHALLENGE BANDA EFFECTIVELY OR INFLUENCE HIS ACTIONS. HIS COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY RESTS ON AN EXTREMELY ASTUTE USE OF THE MALAWI CONGRESS PARTY AND THE POLICE APPARATUS. ABSOLUTE CONTROL REACHES DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

THUS, IT IS LIFE PRESIDENT BANDA WHO IMPACTS ON OUR INTERESTS, BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL. I WOULD EXPECT HIM TO CONTINUE TO ACT ACCORDING TO HIS RELATIVELY NARROW VIEW OF MALAWI AND THE WORLD, I.E., THAT MALAWI IS UNIQUE, THAT HIS POLICY OF DEVELOPING HIS COUNTRY'S ONLY ASSEST, AGRICULTURE, BY THE SWE T OF THE PEASANT IS CORRECT, THAT ABSOLUTE CONTROL IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THAT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE NOT IMPORTANT EXCEPT AS THEY MIGHT IMPACT DIRECTLY UPON THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY OR SECURITY. BANDA IS BASICALLY A PRAGMATIST, ALTHOUGH FROM TIME TO TIME HE WILL TAKE A STAND OF PRINCIPLE ON NON-CRUCIAL ISSUES TO MALAWI SUCH AS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL (MALAWI WAS THE ONLY AFRICAN COUNTRY TO STAY AWAY FROM RECENT AFRO-ARAB SUMMIT AT CAIRO), SOUTH KOREA, ETC.

U.S. INTERESTS MUST BE MEASURED AGAINST BANDA'S
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PAGE 04 LILONG 00505 01 OF 03 010131Z

ISOLATION. HE HAS OPTED OUT OF PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS BY HIS POLICY OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH PRETORIA, TRADE WITH RHODESIA AND AN EGO WHICH HE SHIELDS AGAINST THE BRUI ES INHERENT IN INTER-AFRICAN POLITICS. IN SHORT, BANDA MARCHES TO HIS OWN BEAT, CONVINCED HIS ACTIONS WILL EVENTUALLY PROVE RUGHT. THUS, MALAWI HAS NOT BEEN IMPORTANT TO U.S. EFFORTS TO STIMULATE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THIS SITUATION IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 LILONG 00505 02 OF 03 000000Z
ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 762

INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 LILONGWE 0505

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, PARTICULARLY DETENTION FOR POLITICAL REASONS WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL, AND THE JAILING OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES REPRESENT THE MAJOR PROBLEM WE NOW HAVE WITH THE REGIME. THE LAST TWO YEARS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY BAD, BUT THE RELEASE DURING RECENT MONTHS OF SOME 700 POLITICAL DETAINEES AND SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES WHO SERVED MOST OF THEIR SENTENCES HAS SOMEWHAT EASED THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, I DO NOT DETECT A BASIC CHANGE IN THE REGIME'S ATTITUDE.

IN SUM,; BANDA'S MALAWI DOES NOT OFFER US IMMEDIATE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN AFRICA. HE REPRESENTS AN ISOLATED REGIME WHOSE TIES TO THE WEST, STAUNCH ANTI-COMMINISM, AND SOUND DEVELOPMENT RECORD ARE DEPRCIATED BY INSULARITY AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, BANDA REMAINS BASICALLY FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. AND HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF US IN THE UNITD NATIONS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS SOUTH KOREA, ISRAEL, GUAM, ETC. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, MALAWI COULD OFFER US A RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE HAVEN AMIDST THE NEW AND RADICAL STATES OF THE AREA.

GIVEN THIS MIX OF GOOD AND BAD, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTH A TRY TO GET BANDA TO LOOSEN UP INTERNALLY AND IMPROVE THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LILONG 00505 02 OF 03 000000Z

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. WHILE HE IS ARROGANT AND NOT OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS, HE IS SHREWD WHERE SELF-INTEREST S CONCERNED. HE MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO CHANGE IF WE OFFERED A CARROTT IN THE FORM OF SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED DEVELOPMENT AID; IF WE WERE TO OFFER ONLY A STICK WE WOULD SURELY FAIL TO CHANGE ANYTHING. THE PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS IS ADMITTEDLY QUESTIONABLE, BUT THE COST OF FAILURE WOULD NOT BE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE U.S.

C. OBJECTIVES, ISSUES AND COURSES OF ACTION

THE IMPORTANT U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ZIMBABWIAN AND NAMIBIAN ISSUES AND EVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA ARE ONLY SERVED IN A VERY MARGINAL WAY BY A RELATIONSHIP WITH MALAWI. IN TH EYES OF SOME OF THE "FRONT LINE" LEADERS WITH WHOM WE ARE WORKING TO FIND SOLUTIONS, BANDA IS A TARNISHED FIGURE. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEARLY AMONG U.S. OBJECTIVES THAT MALAWI REMAIN FRIENDLY TO THE U.S., TOLERANT OF THE AMERICAN CITIZENS RESIDING AND WORKING IN MALAWI, RECEQTIVE TO AMERICAN PRIVATE INVESTMENT, ALIGNED WITH THE WEST AND SUPPORTIVE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. IT IS ALSO OUR OBJECTIVE THAT MALAWI SHOULD CONTINUE ITS SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT POLICY. IN VIEW OF ITS

PROBABLE PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE FUTURE, WE SHOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN AS HERETOFORE A CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARMY. BUT THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES MUST NOW BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TERMS OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY.

WE HAVE SO FAR MANIFESTED OUR CONCERN ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY INFORMAL REPRESENTATIONS TO THE GOM ON BEHALF OF THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES IN 1975 AND MORE RECENTLY BY REFUSAL TO HONOR A REQUEST FOR FMS ELIGIBILITY (OUR GENERAL POLICY ON ARMS TRANSFERS AND A LACK OF IMPORTANCE TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS ALSO FIGURED IN THE RATIONALE WE GAVE THE GOM) AND AN INTERNAL MORATORIUM ON MAJOR AID PROJECTS (NOTHING IS PROGRAMMED FOR MALAWI IN FY 77 AND THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PIPELINE SUBSEQUENT TO A \$4 MILLION DOLLAR GRANT TO BUNDA COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE SIGNED IN MID-1976). HOWEVER, TO DATE WE HAVE NOT FORMALLY AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LILONG 00505 02 OF 03 000000Z

FULLY ENUNCIATED HERE THE THRUST OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROBLEMS MALAWI PRESENTS TO US IN THIS FIELD.

ASSUMING THAT FURTHER STEPS OR MOVES WILL BE MADE THROUGHOUT THE AFRICAN CONTINENT IN PURSUANCE OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, I PROPOSE A PHASED APPROACH WHICH SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH OUR LIMITED INTERESTS IN MALAWI. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL SIMPLY TO INFORM BANDA OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEN THREATEN HIM, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH WITHDRAWAL OF AID, PEACE CORPS, AMBASSADORIAL PRESENCE, ETC., IF HE WERE NOT TO RESPOND SATISFACTORILY. IN MY VIEW, SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD MEET WITH TOTAL FAILURE. BANDA'S ARROGANCE WILL REQUIRE FOR HIM MANEUVERING ROOM TO SAVE FACE. HIS OFTEN EXPRESSED FOND MEMORIES OF 12 YEARS' RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. MAY MAKE HIM SOMEWHAT MORE MALLEABLE TO OUR CONCERNS PROVIDED HE SEES SOMETHING OF INTEREST OFFERED. HE STILL LOOKS TO US AS LEADER OF THE "FREE WORLD" AND DESPITE HIS INSULAR APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HE SURELY RECOGNIZES THAT WE ARE HIS ONLY POSSIBLE LINK TO BIG-POWER POLITICS.

SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT I BE INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO BANDA WHICH MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THAT MALAWI'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS OF REAL OR IMAGINED POLITICAL FOES WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL AND HARASSMENT AND ARRESTS OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES) IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR STATED VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (ARTICLES 55 AND 56) AND WITH THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADOPTED BY THE UNGA IN 1948.

(B) THAT OUR GOVERNMENT REALIZES THE TREMENDOUS TASK

OF DEVELOPING MALAWI AND RECOGNIZES BANDA'S FINE ACHIEVEMENTS IN
THIS FIELD; THAT WE UNDERSTAND HOW AN OVERRIDING CONCERN FOR
DEVELOPMENT, GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S VERY LIMITED RESOURCES, MIGHT LEAD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LILONG 00505 02 OF 03 000000Z

TO EXCESS CONTROL IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE STABILITY NECESSARY FOR
SOUND DEVELOPMENT;

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LILONG 00505 03 OF 03 010020Z
ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
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INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 LILONGWE 0505

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

(C) THAT WE VALUE OUR FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIP WITH MALAWI DATING BACK TO ITS PRE-INDEPENDENCE
YEARS; FROM THE EARLIEST YEARS WE HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH MALAWI'S
DEVELOPMENT EFFORT AND WE RECOGNIZE THE GREAT PROGRESS MADE AS
A TRIBUTE TO BANDA'S SOUND APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

(D) THAT WE WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE OUR AID PROGRAM
ON EVEN A LARGER SCALE THAN BEFORE, BUT ARE INHIBITED FROM DOING
SO UNLESS WE MIGHT HAVE ASSURANCES THAT SUCH INCREASED AID WOULD
PERMIT AN EASING OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION RESULTING IN AN END TO
VIOLATIONS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

CONCOMITANT WITH OUR EFFORT I WOULD HOPE THAT WE
MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE BRITISH TO MAKE A SIMILAR DEMARCHE

IN VIEW OF CALLAGHAN'S SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND CONSIDERING THAT THE BRITISH STAKE, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND INFLUENCE IN MALAWI ARE MUCH GREATER THAN OURS. PRESIDENT BANDA WILL VISIT GREAT BRITAIN IN JUNE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, WHICH MIGHT PRESENT A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH ACTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LILONG 00505 03 OF 03 010020Z

THE CARROTT-BEFORE-THE-STICK APPROACH IS A GAMBLE WHICH I READILY ADMIT HAS NO ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS, BUT WHICH I BELIEVE WOULD AT LEAST GIVE BANDA TIME FOR PAUSE AND REFLECTION ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS. ASSUMING AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, DE FACTO IF NOT DE JURE, I HAVE NO HESITATION WHATSOEVER IN RECOMMENDING INCREASED GRANTS AND LOANS TO MALAWI. ITS RECORD OF HONEST AND EFFICIENT USE OF OFFICIAL AID FUNDS HAS IMPRESSED ALL DONORS. THE ECONOMIC PICTURE OF MALAWI HAS RECENTLY WORSENERED AS IN THE CASE OF MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SADDLED WITH INCREASING IMPORT COSTS. THE GROWTH RATE OF GDP AT CONSTANT PRICES WAS 6.1 PERCENT PER YEAR FROM 1964-76, D

ALTHOUGH IN 1975 IT WAS 5.4 PERCENT AND IN 1976 5.3 PERCENT. RESERVES ARE DOWN TO ABOUT \$21.7 MILLION (ABOUT ONE MONTH'S IMPORT REQUIREMENTS) AND A 4.7 MILLION KWACHA DEFICIT ON THE RECURRENT ACCOUNT FIGURES IN THE BUDGET PRESENTATION OF MARCH 18. THIS WORSENING ECONOMIC SITUATION COULD MAKE BANDA MORE RECEPTIVE TO AN OFFERING OF INCREASED U.S. AID IN RETURN FOR ENDING VIOLATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD.

IF BANDA WERE TO AGREE TO MAKE CHANGES, I WOULD RECOMMEND GEARING UP AID PROJECTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES SECTORS FOR FY 1979. THIS WOULD PERMIT US TIME TO MONITOR PROGRESS AND NUDGE BANDA IF THINGS WERE NOT PROGRESSING ACCORDING TO OUR UNDERSTANDING. DURING THIS PHASE I WOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS BY WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT AS WELL AS DISCREETLY PUTTING THE WORD OUT THAT WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MALAWI. HOWEVER, I WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANY PUBLIC SIGNSTHAT WE HAD APPLIED PRESSURE, AS THIS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY CAUSE BANDA TO RENEGE. OUR INITIAL APPROACH TO BANDA SHOULD INCLUDE A COMMITMENZ TO TREAT THIS ISSUE WITH GREAT DISCRETION.

IF BANDA WERE TO REFUSE TO BUDGE, CLAIMING AS HE WELL MIGHT DO THAT HE IS SOLE MASTER OF WHAT HAPPENS IN MALAWI, I OFFER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LILONG 00505 03 OF 03 010020Z

TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO MAKE EVIDENT OUR DISAPPROVAL. THE FIRST (OR SOFTER OPTION) WOULD BE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT AFTER THE CURRENT BUNDA PROJECT IS COMPLETED, THE USG CONTEMPLATES NO MORE MAJOR ASSISTANCE TO MALAWI. SELF-HELP ASSISTANCE WOULD BE CONTINUED AS WELL AS A SMALL PEACE CORPS PROGRAM. THE PRESENT AMBASSADOR MIGHT BE RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION AND KEPT IN THE U.S. FOR A LENGTH OF TIME WHICH WOULD SIGNAL OUR CONCERN, BEFORE RETURNING PERHAPS BEARING A FURTHER MESSAGE; OR, HE MIGHT BE RECALLED AND THE NAMING OF A REPLACEMENT DELAYED FOR A SIMILAR LENGTH OF TIME.

A SECOND (OR HARDER OPTION) WOULD BE TO RECALL THE AMBASSADOR AND LEAVE THE POST INDEFINITELY UNDER A CHARGE; TO CURTAIL THE PRESENT AID PROGRAM BY HALTING THE BUNDA PROJECT WHERE IT IS, I.E. AT \$2,195,000 WHICH HAS BEEN OBLIGATED OUT OF A PROJECTED TOTAL OF NEARLY \$5 MILLION; AND TO TERMINATE THE PEACE CORPS.

I FAVOR THE FIRST OPTION PROVIDED BANDA DOES NOT REACT WITH OVERT HOSTILITY TO OUR HUMAN RIGHTS DEMARCHE. HE WILL NEED TIME TO REACT POSITIVELY IN ANY CASE, AND WE SHOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF READINESS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPENINGS FOR "CONTACT AND DIALOGUE" (BANDA'S OWN FAVORITY PRESCRIPTION) TO RESOLVE OUR PROBLEM. MOREOVER, KEEPING THE PROBLEM HERE IN PERSPECTIVE, SOME OF THE WORST EXCESSES HAVE NOT BEEN CHARACTERISTIC OF MALAWIAN POLITICAL REPRESSION IN RECENT YEARS, E.G. TORTURE, PHYSICAL MALTREATMENT, OTHER CRUELITIES OR MURDER. SHOULD BANDA GET NASTY, I WOULD FAVOR THE SECOND OPTION, PERHAPS EVEN CLOSING DOWN OUR USIS OFFICE AND OPERATIONS IF A TRULY HOSTILE CLIMATE SHOULD PERSIST.

IN SHORT, THE LIMITED OBJECTIVES WE HAVE HERE ARE PRESENTLY OVER-SHADOWED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. SHOULD WE BE ABLE TO OBTAIN AN ACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF AMELIORATION IN THIS AREA, I BELIEVE WE COULD CONTINUE TO CULTIVATE A RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ANTI-COMMUNIST, MODERATE, AND CAPITALISTIC AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LILONG 00505 03 OF 03 010020Z

MUCH AS WE ENJOYED IN THE EARLY DAYS OF BANDA'S REGIME. AS SMALL AND UNIMPORTANT AS THIS PLACE NOW MAY BE, UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS IT COULD BE FOR US A USEFUL ENCLAVE IN THE FUTURE.

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